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 In this essay I try to link Derek Hook’s interpretation of Žižek’s reading of Lacan of racial 
resentment as a kind of jouissance or enjoyment to what Christian Fuchs terms an ideology of hate. In my 
view, slurs are instances of subordinating speech partially to dehumanize targets but primarily function to 
signal and deploy ideology. The enjoyment racists derive from using a slurring term from a key feature of 
the offensiveness of a slurring term.  
 My objective is two-fold. I intend to (1) outline and argue for the enjoyment account of 
subordinating speech as an improvement upon prohibitionist accounts of slurring terms offensive content 
and (2) illustrate how slurs function in a libidinal system to reproduce and reinforce ideology. An enjoyment 
account of subordinating speech depends upon an interpretation of Lacanian concept of jouissance and 
symptom, supplemented by Hook’s libidinal object. 
 Challenges to this endeavor are many. Both jouissance and ideology appear to be simultaneously 
empty and opaque, but I will illustrate these are features that will prove useful to us later. There is the risk 
of collapsing into an individual psychologism, though the model may prove useful in illuminating future 
accounts of subordinating speech. 
 The enjoyment account of subordinating speech enjoys many benefits to previous theories, namely 
in correctly identifying racial resentment in instances in contested acts of slurring and acknowledging the 




 Where some theorists have agreed that the use of slurs is prohibited in virtue of being on a list of 
banned words, I claim a presuppositional account of slurs locates their origin in prohibitions as 
presuppositions regarding a subject’s relation to the other. Niza Yanay makes a parallel claim in The 
Ideology of Hatred, placing prohibitions as the integral feature of subject formation. Based on Freud’s 
notion of the unconscious, Yanay posits the political unconscious as the region of “speech that denies itself” 
which form the kernel of the site of oppositions that constitute the subject (53). These oppositions are 
animated by power structures of the dominating ideology, founded upon the law of repression. What is 
repressed is the unthought demand for love refused by a prior prohibition. These prohibitions are the 
bigoted subject’s unrecognized and veiled desire for the Other that emerge from the unthinkable question 
of which national discourse revolves - “What if I become like the Other?” (33). I claim these presupposed 
prohibitions form the basis of the fear of annihilation reaction implicit in the messaging of hate speech. 
 
ENJOYMENT ACCOUNT OF SUBORDINATING SPEECH 
 
 What is jouissance? While a particular definition would necessarily fill a shelf and then some, for 
our purposes we shall use the condensed formulation offered by Hook. Jouissance is a painful arousal of 
the “erotic appeal of overstepping boundaries”. It is excess, or more precisely, “the appeal of excess 
matched only by the thrill of doing what we shouldn’t” (Hook, 10).  
 What makes jouissance an effective/affective mark in locating the offensiveness of slurs? The 
excessive nature or ‘guilty pleasures’ of jouissance separate it from mere gratification. Indeed, as Hook 
notes, “The deliberate transgression of polite social norms entails a kind of reflexive appreciation of its own 
offensiveness” (13) which is seen in the delight of racists. Delight, under free association, recalls a loss of 
illumination, or a blinding. Similarly, Yanay notes, “Laughter is one way to blind ourselves to the structuring 
power of ideological fantasy” (45). Slurs are not unlike very distinct laughs in that they represent a relation 
to the structure of enjoyment, in that for one to ‘enjoy’ the joke, one must be ‘in’ on the joke. In the same 
way, to understand a slur is to understand what make it offensive. 
 While laughter is undirected, language has divided laughter in a way that it is always oriented 
towards an object. One need to look no further than the common question “what are you laughing at?” To 
laugh for ones enjoyment invites curiosity from the subject, especially a subject unacquainted with the yelps, 
guffaws, and chuckles of the other. However, in situations where a subject hears this ‘non-sense laughter of 
the other’ is interpreted by the subject as not only undeserved enjoyment but stolen, specifically, the other 
has stolen the enjoyment of the subject (Hook, 2).  One easily finds examples of bigots complaining about 
the sound, tone, accent, and so on of an other. It is a moving target because it is not about any of those 
features in particular, but “something in them that isn’t them” (Hook, 16). That ‘thing’ is the enjoyment of 
the other, the reified libidinal object of the subject.  
 
THE LIBIDINAL OBJECT 
 
 Hook makes use of a mode of jouissance, the libidinal object, which structures the enjoyment of 
the subject around the protection of the most sacred ideal. What is the libidinal object? For Hook, it takes 
many forms but represents the highest ideal for an individual within a community. reproduced in list form 
below: 
 
1. It is an emblem of potency and value  
2. Constituted by signifiers of desire and desirability  
3. A source of narcissistic pleasure 
4. In danger of being snatched away 
 
 To a sufficiently bigoted subject, the language they speak qualifies as an example (and, in fact, 
English is the one that Hook uses) of 1-4. The tools of communication of the protection of a shared idea, of 
which slurs fit in virtue of their service to an ideology, become reified as commodities to be deployed in the 
reproduction and maintenance of the subject’s fear of annihilation or loss. The imagined loss is made real 
by explicit prohibition of the words that signify the other.  
 As Hook points out, the symptom only stays in place as long as the subject is unaware of its 
structuring effects (45). Therefore the bigoted subject position is temporary, contingent upon the ignorance 
of the subject. The contingency of the bigoted position answers handily how people can both abandon 
resentment to a point but can also repress resentment within the same mechanism of enjoyment. The bigot 
will transform the libidinal object to another signifier. 
 Interesting here is the marking quality of slurs that inscribe upon the speaker an identity of not-G 
(Stanley, 148). This inside/outside distinction constitutes the very boundary of group dynamics. How this 
boundary is grasped by the subject and the other depends upon their respective positions. Here, Hook’s 
concept of convexity illustrates the imposition of the other. 
 Hook claims what we hate in the other is the “convexity of the subject’s lack” (17). Restated, it is 
reified, materialized lack possessed by the other. The lack of the subject is the difference and interface 
between subject and other. The term ‘convexity’ is apt if only for the implied concavity of the subject in 
response to the imagined infringement from the other’s sphere of influence. Because the subject cannot 
love the object and the object cannot love the subject, what appears is a failed love in the form of hate. 
 
WHAT IS HATE? 
 
 Yanay claims “hatred is a forceful embodied experience, and even when not always admitted and 
spoken, it is felt, projected, and acted upon” (33). She continues, stating that hatred “carries a message”. 
That message is the ideology which constitutes and conceals the class relations implicit and explicit to the 
deployment of subordinating speech. Hence, why the undertone of slurs demands the target to “know their 
place” irrespective of actually being the target of the slurring term.  
 The disregard of the truth conditions of slurs is interesting here in that it further confirms slurs as 
functioning in relation to their effects, namely in construction and concealing the class relations of ideology 
(Yanay, 44).  
 
Consider the following example, where G signifies a slurring term 
 
[1] There better not be any Gs here! 
 
A view also shared by Lynne Tirrell and Elizabeth Camp, [1] serves distinctly as a warning and a signal to 
the attitudes and beliefs of the speaker of [1] who explicitly declares a region in space better if they were to 
not find anyone who fits (or rather, reveals) a refused class relation between a speaker of subordinating 
speech and an other. implicitly, here the slur functions as a demand for the other and a demand of the 
other. These demands precipitate from ideology and are rooted in fantasy. 
  
FANTASY IS A PARADOX OF POWER 
 
 Yanay locates the nexus of conflict lay in the subject’s relation to the desire of the other (37). 
Hatred presupposes love. That is to say, as human subjects we want to love and we want to be loved. Loving 
another makes us dependent upon the other. However, hating another makes us dependent upon an other. 
Both options usurp upon the power of the subject, thus giving rise to the appearance that the other ‘has 
something that isn’t them’ and that the subject has lost something, stolen by the other.  
  Yanay reveals the paradox driving the fundamental fantasy undergirding political power - to control 
another, one must depend upon another to control (37). This dependency of the controller upon the 
controlled has the repressed consequent that no one is actually in control. Yanay writes, “The denial of 
attachment creates symptomatic relations which revolve around repeated prejudices, misrecognitions, and 
failures of communicative language” (37). These failures of communicative language result in the bigoted 
subject’s prejudices impressed upon the targets of hate-speech. They are symptomatic in the sense of 
representing something else other than the slur’s extension out in the world and signal a cluster of 
properties consequently associated with the speaker of a slur. In other words, slurs are symptomatic of an 
ideology of hate. 
 
Fuchs states that “Ideology is a strategy of reproducing domination and exploitation that operates in 
the realms of communication, culture, psychology, emotions, and beliefs (217). Fuchs echoes Georg Lukács 
point that ideology functions to conceal and justify the veiled relation between people (217). Slurs function 
to delight the community of speakers who use them thus blinding them from the effects of ideology and the 
associated subordinating speech.  
 
 Bianca Cepollaro characterizes derogatory content of slurs as not merely presupposed but imposed 
upon the audience (para. 23). What is important here is the uncontested feature of that which is imposed. 
Imposition is stronger than an assertion in virtue of an imposed object cannot be cancelled by a speaker, 




Cepollaro differentiates slurs from stereotypes in dint of promoting discrimination as a given (para.24). for 
the bigoted position, discrimination is assumed. Racial resentment is found to be self-generating in an 
ideology of hatred. Wielding a slur invokes socio-historical relations. Consider the following example of a 
bigoted response of [2] to reappropriated slurs, from stubborn speakers who continue to use a slur upon 
being engaged for their use a slurring term G 
 
[2] “why can they say G but I can’t?” 
 
[3] (They have taken something from me) 
 
From the subject position of the bigot, a belief in [3] follows from [2]. reappropriative slur utterances 
confirm their presuppositions that the other has taken something from the bigot. The bigot can no longer 
explicitly say G. 
 Even in reappropriating use cases, an out-group target speaker of a slurring term will distance 
themselves from their use, as if to ‘trade places’ with the original. While this may seem as an instance of 
reification of the slur, appropriation is a better strategy to mitigate the effects of subordinating speech than 
meeting a slur with silence. To intervene interrupts the flow of signification and introduces a new demand. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH ENJOYMENT 
 
The enjoyment account of subordinating speech does not arrive unmarked. Jouissance is such an 
excessively expansive category it risks losing all meaning. However, this is a feature of jouissance that 
ensures it as a sociologically useful variable. Hook claims this serves a dual purpose of moving beyond the 
objection of psychologism (22). 
 
BENEFITS OF JOUISSANCE 
 
The enjoyment account offers robust explanatory power. Hook points to two advantages of framing 
subordinating speech as a kind of enjoyment: (a) identifying the libidinal component of bigoted speech and 
(b) admitting that the racist enjoys slurring (13).  
 
The enjoyment account also allows for the responses of the self-flagellating subject, or one who uses a 
denigrating term to refer to themselves and accepts the scripts associated with that term. the Prohibitionist 
account would offer no recompense to why a self-flagellating subject would engage in self-destructive 
behavior, whereas a theory of enjoyment may locate it in their contradictions. 
 
Prohibitionism fails to account for subject position of reappropriated utterances of slurs. Wthe If a slur is 
deemed a slur in virtue of being on a list of banned words, there is no possibility for distinction in use, 
particularly non-derogative uses like pedagogical utterances. In effect, prohibitionism is an extension of an 
ideology of hatred in its strategy to silence.  
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